Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C, Euclid and Marian David

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37 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid]
Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend]
Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid]
Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays]
Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]